

19 SEPT 1973

#38-73

STATOREC

Approved For Release 1999/09/25 : CIA-RDP86T00975R000600050048-5

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA  
CONF

1 OF 1


**Confidential**

**F B I S**

# **TRENDS**

**in Communist Propaganda**

STATSPEC




**Confidential**

19 SEPTEMBER 1973  
(VOL. XXIV, NO. 38)

This propaganda analysis report is based exclusively on material carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government components.

STATSPEC



NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION  
Unauthorized disclosure subject to  
criminal sanctions

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

19 SEPTEMBER 1973

## CONTENTS

### CHILEAN COUP

Communist Powers Issue Pro Forma Protests Over Allende Ouster. . . . 1

### INDOCHINA

Hanoi Comment on Chilean Coup Revives Attacks on President . . . . 5

DRV, PRG Respond Guardedly to Charges of Air Buildup in South. . . . 7

Castro Visit Marked by Trip to PRG Area, Reappearance of Giap. . . . 8

### SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Moscow, Allies React Cautiously to 10th CCP Congress . . . . . 11

Peking Heightens Propaganda Offensive Against Soviet Hegemony. . . . 13

### NOTES

USSR on Pompidou PRC Visit; USSR Dissidents;  
Reactions to Lao Protocol. . . . . 15

### APPENDIX

Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics. . . . . i

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 1 -

## CHILEAN COUP

## COMMUNIST POWERS ISSUE PRO FORMA PROTESTS OVER ALLENDE OUSTER

In response to the military coup in Chile, both Moscow and Peking gave clear signs that the event would not be allowed to stand in the way of their respective efforts to improve relations with Washington. On 13 September Moscow issued a prompt but mildly worded CPSU Central Committee "statement" that went through the motions of denouncing the coup without directly criticizing the United States. The statement, like other CPSU declarations of this kind, served more as an expression of ideological solidarity than as an instrument of practical diplomacy. Peking did not issue any formal declaration on the coup and sidestepped specific charges of U.S. or other foreign involvement in its treatment of Chilean events. The communist states of East Europe, with the notable exception of East Germany, denounced the coup along lines paralleling the Moscow statement.

MOSCOW In keeping with the proprieties of Moscow's detente diplomacy, the CPSU Central Committee statement on the overthrow of Allende's government discreetly avoided any explicit mention of the United States in denouncing the "reactionary forces" responsible for the coup and their "foreign imperialist" backers. By contrast, an East German party statement, released the day before the Soviet statement, explicitly condemned "U.S. imperialism" as the main bulwark of foreign support for Chilean reaction. Characteristically, a 13 September PRAVDA summary of the East German statement dropped the reference to the United States. Asserting that the overthrow was in open violation of the laws and constitution of Chile, the Moscow statement offered expressions of "full solidarity" with the "progressive" forces in Chile.

Moscow over the years has used the device of a CPSU Central Committee statement to register disapproval of actions taken against communist parties in non-communist countries. The last statement of this kind was made on 11 October 1968 in connection with the suppression of Indonesian communists. Similar statements, on 16 February and 11 March 1963, were used to condemn the persecution of "progressive" forces in Iraq and the execution of Iraqi communists. CPSU statements protesting the ban on the Algerian communist party and the Tunisian communist party were issued on 4 December 1962 and 19 January 1963, respectively. By using this format in the current instance, Moscow chose to restrict its

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

19 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 2 -

censure to a party rather than a governmental level even though the Chilean communists were part of a ruling coalition.

Having established its official position in unmistakable terms, Moscow launched a low-key propaganda campaign, routinely protesting the events in Chile and expressing "militant solidarity" with that country's "progressive" forces. Internal and foreign reaction and "foreign monopolies" were assailed for their subversive actions and "economic sabotage" of the Chilean economy. Although the campaign adhered generally to the line set out in the Central Committee statement, some comment contained intimations of a U.S. role in the Chilean coup. Thus, a report in PRAVDA on the 13th noted that U.S. corporations, such as ITT, "are not concealing their satisfaction with respect to the coup and have hastened" to renew their activities in Chile.

Other Soviet commentaries hinted at U.S. complicity in the coup by citing third sources. For example, the unofficial Radio Peace and Progress, in a 15 September broadcast, reported the remarks of a U.S. Congressman to the effect that "U.S. economic policy played quite a significant role in encouraging the antigovernment coup in Chile." And TASS on the 17th reported Castro's statement to Indian journalists, during his stopover in New Delhi that day, suggesting that the Chilean reaction "would not have been able to stage a military coup had it not been for the support of American imperialism."\* Soviet party leader, Brezhnev, currently on a "friendly visit" to Bulgaria, made reference to the Chilean coup and death of Allende in a 19 September speech in Sofia. His remarks paralleled the CPSU Central Committee statement in citing foreign imperialist support for the coup without suggesting U.S. complicity. Thus, Brezhnev ascribed responsibility for the coup to the "exploiter classes" and "reactionary military-higher-ups," supported and encouraged by "imperialist forces abroad."

PEKING      Peking did not issue any formal declaration on the events in Chile and its only comment has come in two low-level NCNA articles--on 13 and 17 September--which cited reports from

---

\* Castro arrived in North Vietnam on his official visit shortly after the coup. In remarks at a welcoming banquet on the 12th, he noted that he had been informed about it by Le Duan. A sharply worded Cuban government statement, belatedly issued on the 18th, denounced the "fascist coup" not merely as an expression of internal reaction but also as an integral part of U.S. strategy for the western hemisphere.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

19 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 3 -

Santiago to condemn the coup, praise Allende's resistance and to report continuing popular resistance to the "putschist authorities." Peking sidestepped specific charges of U.S. or other foreign involvement, stating only that the coup was staged in the wake of "incidents engineered by certain reactionary forces at home and abroad." The Chinese carefully softpedaled direct criticism of the new military junta, though mentioning its chief members by name.

Chinese circumspection regarding the coup was pointed up in Chou En-lai's 14 September condolence message to Mrs. Allende and his remarks at a banquet for French President Pompidou that same day. Avoiding any mention of the coup or how Allende met his death, Chou praised the Chilean president as a defender of Chilean and third world rights and pointed to his "heroic death" as an inspiration to the Chilean people who, he predicted, will draw a lesson from the "tragic event" and continue to "march ahead."

EAST EUROPE        With the exception of East Germany, which released a sharply worded party statement on the 12th, Moscow's orthodox allies in East Europe issued party statements condemning the Chilean coup in terms similar to the CPSU statement. Where the Poles denounced "international monopolies" for complicity in the coup, the Bulgarian, Hungarian and Czechoslovak statements merely attacked "imperialism." Prague and Budapest, with their own experience in mind, added the epithet "counterrevolutionary" to their characterizations of the coup. As for the three East European mavericks, the Yugoslav party issued a strikingly bitter denunciation of the coup on the 12th, the Romanian party released a more moderate statement the next day and the leading Albanian front organization followed with a statement on the 15th.

Yugoslavia, fresh from its leadership role at the nonaligned conference in Algiers, reacted promptly to the Chilean coup with a bitterly-worded LCY Presidium Executive Bureau statement "sharply condemning this criminal act by sinister, reactionary, imperialist and neocolonialist forces." The statement all but named the United States in declaring that progress could not be stopped in Latin America or elsewhere through foreign intervention and interference or military putches, and stressed the need for third world unity in the light of the Chilean events.

The Romanian party Central Committee declaration was milder in tone than Belgrade's but akin to the latter in deploring the setback to

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 4 -

the world "progressive" movement, adding characteristically that the coup seriously prejudiced "the national independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Chile." Almost simultaneously with the release of the party statement, AGERPRES reported Ceausescu--who had been scheduled to visit Chile--as registering "anxiety" over the Chilean developments and sorrow at Allende's death, in a Bogota, Colombia press conference.

Tirana limited its official reaction to a statement by the Albanian Democratic Front which repeatedly attacked "U.S. imperialism." While Belgrade's statement expressed solidarity with the Chilean communist party--a staunch ally of Moscow in the quarrel with Peking--the statements from Bucharest and Tirana supported only Chilean "progressive forces."

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 5 -

## INDOCHINA

At sharp variance with North Vietnam's generally circumspect attitude since the signing of the peace agreements last January, some recent Hanoi propaganda has sharply criticized President Nixon and Secretary of State designate Kissinger. Gratuitous attacks were aimed at the President and Kissinger in editorials discussing the Chilean coup in the party daily NHAN DAN on 15 and 16 September, and the same paper on the 18th took issue with Kissinger's exposition of U.S. policies in Asia. It is possible that these attacks reflect the view of at least some circles in Hanoi that accommodation with the United States is not a viable policy through which to achieve such goals as reconstruction in the North and expansion of communist control in the South. Such a view would seem to accord with the line taken in the articles last month in which the authoritative military commentator "Chien Thang" appeared to be arguing that military action in the South is a feasible way to achieve communist goals.

Although the explicit attacks on the White House are a new element in Hanoi's propaganda, there has been a less direct manifestation of its hostility toward the Administration. Not since last June has Hanoi comment raised the prospect of improving U.S.-DRV relations--a notion that previously had been mentioned periodically along with the admonition that better relations were dependent on the scrupulous implementation of the peace accord. It remains to be seen whether the attacks on the Administration introduced in the reaction to events in Chile will now be repeated in propaganda on developments in Vietnam.

While there was no official North Vietnamese government or party statement on the coup, the tenor of Hanoi's substantial comment has indicated its distress over the toppling of a regime which they viewed as a symbol of the progress of world revolutionary forces. The preoccupation with the coup was also reflected in the publicity for Cuban Premier Castro's visit--a visit cut short because of events in Chile.

## HANOI COMMENT ON CHILEAN COUP REVIVES ATTACKS ON PRESIDENT

At variance with recent restraint, the 16 September NHAN DAN editorial on the Chilean coup leveled harsh attacks on the "Nixon-Kissinger clique" and on Soviet and Chinese policies of accommodation with Washington. The criticism of the Administration seems the more notable since three days earlier the paper had published an

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 6 -

unexceptional editorial on the coup which had blamed it on "U.S. imperialism" and "reactionaries" in Chile but had not mentioned the President nor Kissinger. In what appears to be an orchestrated progression, a 15 September editorial on Laos interjected a direct attack on the President and his adviser for the events in Chile, and the editorial on the 16th--four days after the coup--concentrated on condemning the Administration.

Charging that the coup was the product of the "Nixon-Kissinger clique's global strategy," the NHAN DAN editorial on the 16th ridiculed the notion that the Nixon Doctrine is based on negotiations, reduced foreign commitments, and noninterference. Stressing the "counterrevolutionary" nature of the Nixon Doctrine and admonishing Moscow and Peking, it said: "It is obvious that the Nixon clique has pursued a policy of feigned, temporary detente toward a number of major countries, so as to be free to consolidate its forces to oppose the world revolutionary movement, bully the small countries, curb the national liberation movement, and continue to maintain U.S. neocolonialism in Asia, Africa, and Latin America." NHAN DAN also stressed the basic precept in Hanoi's polemic on the question of relations with the United States, asserting that the Chilean coup has again demonstrated that "the U.S. imperialists have invariably been and continue to be the main enemy--the number-one enemy and the biggest and most cruel pirate facing various peoples and progressive mankind."

As a forerunner of this anti-Administration polemic, the interjection in the 15 September NHAN DAN editorial on the Laos peace agreement said that the Chilean coup was new evidence of "the Nixon clique's cruel and malicious policy" and of the U.S. position as the primary enemy. It claimed that "everyone has clearly seen the U.S. imperialists' hands and intelligence ringleader Kissinger's direct leading role" in the coup. Such gratuitous vilification of Kissinger is a sharp departure from Hanoi's usual circumspect treatment of the Presidential adviser which has implicitly recognized his special position as the chief U.S. negotiator with North Vietnam.\*

Kissinger came under fire again, on 18 September, when Hanoi media took exception to remarks he had made on the 10th during his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Hanoi

---

\* Hanoi's caution toward Kissinger was reflected, for example, in comment on his statements following the signing of the 13 June joint communique. See the TRENDS of 20 June 1973, pages 9-10.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 7 -

radio cited Kissinger's affirmation that U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia would continue along with extracts from a 13 September speech by U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Sullivan, which, it said, he had delivered "after meeting and receiving instructions from Kissinger." The broadcast commented that the statements by the two officials "revealed the Nixon Administration's odious design and perfidious policy aimed at stubbornly pursuing the Nixon Doctrine in Asia" and "clearly outlined the Nixon Administration's policy of deliberately and premeditatedly violating" the Paris agreement, the international act on Vietnam, and the 13 June joint communique.

Hanoi had reported Kissinger's nomination as Secretary of State without critical comment, but some of his remarks in his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had been cited in a 15 September Hanoi account of the four-power Joint Military Commission (JMC) meeting on the 13th. The account noted that the DRV representative on the JMC had criticized Kissinger's statement to the Senate Committee on the 7th in which he linked possible future U.S. economic aid to North Vietnam to communist cooperation in accounting for U.S. servicemen missing in action. However, a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 11th made no mention of Kissinger in rejecting criticism by "U.S. authorities" of DRV implementation of the provisions of the peace agreement regarding missing U.S. servicemen.

#### DRV, PRG RESPOND GUARDEDLY TO CHARGES OF AIR BUILDUP IN SOUTH

The DRV and PRG responded to U.S. and Saigon protests over military buildup in PRG controlled areas of South Vietnam with foreign ministry statements which labeled the charges as "slander." The charges--in the U.S. Government note on 10 September and the Saigon government press conference statement on the 11th--were enumerated in a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 12th and a foreign ministry note to the State Department on the 14th. Noting that the alleged actions included repairing and construction of airfields along with the introduction from the North of air defense units, including SA-2 missile units, the DRV observed that under the Paris agreement, the PRG "is the sole authority that has the right to decide all matters in order to protect the people, defend its sovereignty, territory, airspace, and territorial waters . . . "--implying that, even if the allegations were true, they are of no concern to the United States or Saigon.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 8 -

The PRG statement, issued by the foreign ministry spokesman on the 12th, made the same case for having sole authority "to decide all affairs in accord with its functions and power in domestic and foreign affairs," but it mentioned only Saigon's note and referred only to the charges involving the repair and construction of the 12 airfields. However, the PRG has previously responded to charges of missile placement, and flatly denied the deployment of missiles in a statement at the 28 February session of the four-party JMC.\*

Allied charges that Hanoi is preparing for a new war and warnings of possible retaliation against the DRV and PRG territory were specifically cited and deprecated in the DRV spokesman's statement. The spokesman accused the United States and Saigon of uttering "odious slanderous allegations and insolent threats" against the DRV in order to prepare public opinion for "new adventurous acts in South Vietnam," and he warned that the southern people and PLAF would "appropriately punish" any encroachment in PRG areas. The DRV note and PRG statement were less forthright--admonishing that the United States and Saigon must bear the consequences or responsibility for any violations of PRG areas.

#### CASTRO VISIT MARKED BY TRIP TO PRG AREA, REAPPEARANCE OF GIAP

Arriving directly from the nonaligned summit conference in Algiers, Cuban Premier Fidel Castro was given a top-level, enthusiastic welcome in Hanoi on 12 September. Along with "tens of thousands of welcomers lining the road," he was met by Politburo members Le Duan, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Vo Nguyen Giap, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Le Thanh Nghi. Giap, who had not appeared in public since last July, also was among the leaders attending numerous other activities in the following days.\*\* The Politburo members who welcomed Castro also turned out, along with Le Duc Tho, for a banquet in his honor that evening.

---

\* See the TRENDS of 7 March 1973, page 4.

\*\* It is unlikely that Giap's extended absence was due to any serious physical impairment. Had he been too ill to make a traditional appearance at the 1 September DRV National Day ceremonies he surely would not have been able to carry on such a strenuous schedule during Castro's visit. Giap's absence is discussed in the TRENDS of 6 September 1973, pages 11-12.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 9 -

In addition to the initial banquet, Castro's activities included talks with Polithuro members and officials of the DRV Foreign Ministry on the 13th, a visit to the Quang Binh-Vinh Linh area, accompanied by Pham Van Dong, between the 14th and 16th, and a trip to the PRG "liberated area" on the 15th. A final banquet attended by President Ton Duc Thang and the other top leaders was held on the 16th, prior to Castro's departure the following day.

Superlatives were repeatedly used to describe the atmosphere of the "official friendly visit." The initial banquet was said to have been marked by "warm fraternal friendly and militant solidarity" and the talks the next day "proceeded in an atmosphere brimming over with cordiality, militant solidarity, and fraternity." The PRG communique issued on the occasion of Castro's foray into PRG-controlled territory declared that the visit "ended with successes," and the joint DRV-Cuban statement issued on 17 September said that Castro had been welcomed in "an extremely warm and cordial manner, demonstrating lucidly the militant solidarity and fraternal friendship that have long linked the Vietnamese people with the Cuban people." The statement further described the talks between the two delegations as taking place in "an atmosphere of cordiality and joy over victory, seething with militant solidarity and fraternal friendship." It added that "the two sides unanimously agreed on the questions raised."

The events in Chile obviously cast a somber cloud over the entire visit, especially for Castro. The first mention of the coup came in a brief allusion to it by Le Duan in his banquet speech on the 12th. Without elaborating, he merely announced: "We sternly condemn the military putsch staged by the reactionary lackeys of the U.S. imperialists against the government headed by President Allende." In contrast, Castro reflected his more open concern when, speaking at the same banquet, he more forthrightly described the news of the coup as "painful" and as a "reverse for the revolutionary movement." He specifically noted that the "government of President Allende had been overthrown" and detailed the attacks by Chilean armed forces on the Cuban embassy in Santiago and on a Cuban freighter. By the time he had reached PRG territory in Quang Binh, Castro had made up his mind to curtail his visit because of the coup, and he announced this decision in his rally speech there. He declared that he had decided to cut short the visit, which originally had been planned as a "relatively long" one, "for the sake of solidarity with the Chilean people, because of the present difficulties that have arisen, and because the coup-instigators have attacked the Cuban Embassy and a Cuban merchant vessel."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 10 -

The speeches of the Cuban and Vietnamese leaders clearly and repeatedly reflected their kinship in their roles as the "staunch fighters who are defending the two outposts of the socialist system, respectively in Southeast Asia and the Western Hemisphere." Nevertheless, their statements also confirmed that economic and geographic realities severely restrict anything but the most meager commitment of Cuban aid to the Vietnamese. Castro, in his speech on the 12th declared: "We will join in the reconstruction of Vietnam. The laboring people and labor brigades of Cuba will come to Vietnam to take part in rebuilding hospitals, agricultural and stockbreeding centers, and communications lines, and other activities to do its modest share in this work." And in his Quang Binh rally speech, he promised the participation of "a number of Cuban comrades" in the construction of a hospital there. However, the joint statement contained only a single vague reference to any kind of aid in the bland assertion that "both sides have discussed measures to support and help the DRV in overcoming the aftermath of the war and stepping up the building of socialism."

While the friendship of Vietnam and Cuba on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism was lauded in speeches during the visit, the leaders did not address themselves to the question of international communist unity. In the joint statement, however, both sides endorsed Hanoi's standard call for the "restoration and consolidation of unity among the socialist countries."

The recent nonaligned summit conference was predictably recalled in statements during Castro's visit. Le Duan, in his banquet speech on the 12th, carefully limited his comments on Castro's conference speech to a polite acknowledgment of his "heartfelt words" on Vietnam. Castro, on the same occasion, included an indirect reference to his defense of Soviet policies at the conference, noting that the Cuban delegation "had to undertake an arduous struggle against the tendency to play up nonaligned nations against the socialist countries."

Castro's visit to PRG-controlled territory in Quang Tri marked the first such visit by a head of state. The visit was in keeping with a tradition of firsts in Cuban-PRG relations--Cuba being the first country to have recognized and established diplomatic relations with the NFL and the first country to appoint an ambassador to the "liberated zone." Castro was welcomed by Tran Nam Trung, vice president of the presidium of the NFLSV Central Committee and PRG defense minister, standing in for NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, who is still abroad, and PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, who was said to be absent "for some special work."

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 11 -

## SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

## MOSCOW, ALLIES REACT CAUTIOUSLY TO 10TH CCP CONGRESS

Moscow has so far exhibited caution in assessing the results of the 10th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. The only major commentary to date in the central newspapers was by IZVESTIYA political commentator Aleksandr Bovin in the 12 September issue of that paper. PRAVDA has restricted its coverage to replays of critical comment from the foreign, including the American, press. By contrast, four East European countries have published critical articles on the Congress in their party newspapers.

MOSCOW Perhaps because of the absence of an authoritative assessment of the foreign policy implications of the Congress, the Soviet public response has thus far concentrated on its domestic aspects. To judge from the limited comment alone, however, Moscow has concluded that the future of Sino-Soviet relations is no brighter as a result of the Congress.

Bovin, for example, asserted that the main task of the Congress had been domestic--a "legalization" of the new political lineup that had formed over the past two years. He and other commentators concluded that, while contradictions within the Peking leadership continued, there was a firm consensus among all factions on an anti-Soviet course. This conclusion was seconded in the 14 September NEW TIMES (No. 37) by Vadim Zubakov, who provided at least a tentative, if routine, assessment of the foreign policy implications of the Congress. Zubakov found evidence in the Congress that Peking had "definitively rejected" a class approach and would continue to intensify its struggle against the Soviet Union and its allies.

These pessimistic assessments are consistent with Moscow's recent efforts to isolate China ideologically as a means of reinforcing unity in the socialist community in a period of relaxed international tensions. In themselves, however, they provide little evidence to suggest that Moscow is yet prepared to call a world conference of communist parties for the purpose of reading the CCP out of the movement. Indeed, the caution Moscow has displayed in covering the Congress, particularly its failure to mount a post-Congress broadside at Peking, suggests that no decision on convening any such conference has yet been reached.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 12 -

Bovin at any rate stopped well short of calling for any such decisive political action against the Chinese. Indeed, his article could be read as counseling caution in this respect. While describing in derogatory terms the motivations and capabilities of the Chinese leaders, he expressed confidence that a time would eventually arrive in China when "a change in politicians will lead to a change in policy." In the foreseeable future, however, Bovin held out no hope of any change in Peking's anti-Soviet course. Zubakov in NEW TIMES likewise observed that the Peking leaders were determined to lead China even further away from socialism.

**EAST EUROPE** Comment in East Europe generally paralleled Moscow's contention that the Congress signals a continuation of a strong anti-Soviet line in Peking and that the Chinese leaders remain seriously divided. The East Europeans were more prompt in reacting to the Congress as well as more polemical in their comment. They generally adhered to standard themes, however, in denouncing Peking's policy and in urging active opposition to its alleged attempts to divide the socialist community.

The Czechoslovaks were the most polemical, going so far as to suggest that Chinese policy had produced a de facto split in the socialist community. RUDE PRAVO on 3 September published a commentary by Deputy Chief Editor Zdenek Horeni uniquely asserting that China's "splitting policy," which Horeni said had been "intensified" by the Congress had required the "socialist countries and fraternal communist parties" to establish a "second front of the ideological struggle." This portion of the commentary was published in boldface type and was included in the lengthy excerpts transmitted by TASS; PRAVDA, on 7 September, however, deleted the relevant sentence from its otherwise complete report of the TASS dispatch.

The Hungarian and East German articles did not go as far as the Czechoslovak commentary on this issue, but they also called for aggressive ideological action against Chinese policy. Ferenc Varnai, the foreign political editor of NEPSZABADSAG, maintained on the 5th that "there is no other course than to continue struggling to unmask and isolate" Chinese policy. In the NEUES DEUTSCHLAND commentary on the 2d, the author adjured all progressive forces to "recognize the reactionary nature of Peking's policies and come out in active opposition against them." Peter Stoyanov, commenting in Sofia's RABOTNICHESKO DELO on the

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
15 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 13 -

4th, sidestepped this issue, but otherwise sharply denounced Chinese policy. Poland's TRYBUNA LUDU has not published any original comment but other Polish newspapers have furnished critical evaluations of the Congress.

Apart from Ceausescu's congratulatory message to Mao on 1 September, Romanian media have avoided comment on the Congress.

### PEKING HEIGHTENS PROPAGANDA OFFENSIVE AGAINST SOVIET HEGEMONY

In the wake of Chou En-lai's political report to the 10th CCP Congress which all but wrote off any prospect for improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, Peking has increased both the volume and scope of its polemic against Moscow. Peking has again highlighted the specter of Moscow's hegemony in sensitive areas of Asia, expanded its criticism of Soviet policy over border problems, and has even begun to portray the United States as directly threatened by unbridled Soviet military expansion.

Epitomizing the hardening of Peking's stance against Moscow, Chou En-lai used the occasion of the banquet for French President Pompidou on 11 September to underscore his comprehensive indictment of the Soviet Union at the Chinese party congress. While deferring to his guest in not mentioning the Soviet Union by name, Chou castigated Soviet intentions in notably harsh terms. The premier equated Soviet policies with the world hegemony practiced by 18th century emperors, labeled Soviet expansion "the major cause of world tension," and pointedly asserted that the Soviet leaders "try to fix" anyone who does not meekly submit to their dictate. Chou confidently breathed defiance at Soviet pressure, affirming that Peking "will never bow or yield to any threat of force."

#### ASIAN SECURITY, BORDER ISSUES

As a focal point of its stepped up campaign, Peking has sought to counter what has been portrayed as an expanding Soviet effort to solidify an anti-Chinese bloc in Asia under the guise of an Asian collective security system. Most notably, a 9 September NCNA article criticizing Soviet policy in Cambodia warned against Soviet use of the Asian security system as a vehicle for expansion into Southeast Asia. Unlike similar articles in recent months which attacked Moscow for encouraging a Cambodian peace settlement contrary to the insurgents' interests, the NCNA article accused Moscow of coveting the port of Kompong Som for its naval forces in the South China sea; it highlighted Moscow's

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 14 -

efforts to peddle the security system in the context of Vietnam and Indochina, and asserted that the Soviet Union seeks to replace the United States as the dominant power in the area. Emphasizing the point, Peking on 13 September replayed Thai comment noting that the Soviet security proposal was similar to the U.S.-dominated SEATO alliance.

While continuing to sidestep specific references to the stalled border talks, the recent Chinese comment has castigated Soviet policy over border problems. Notably, a 25 August NCNA article went to great detail to condemn the Brezhnev regime's rewriting of the history of tsarist expansion in Europe and Asia, claiming that Brezhnev is seeking to hide the "unequal" tsarist treaties with China and to expunge from the record evidence supporting Chinese claims that large areas of Soviet Asia were once under Chinese rule. Equating the Soviet regime with the Romanov dynasty, Peking harshly charged that the same "black line" of tsarist "Great Russian chauvinism and imperialism" motivates the policies of the "Khrushchev-Brezhnev dynasty." Subsequently, Peking replayed Japanese comment that "a facet of Soviet foreign policy is not to yield an inch of land on any territory it has seized no matter what is the historical process."

SOVIET-U.S. CONTENTION      Consistent with Chou's denunciation, in his congress report, of a continuing Soviet military threat and his characterization of the United States as "on the decline," Peking has added a new twist to its view of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance. Whereas the Chinese had traditionally viewed the United States and the Soviet Union as strategic equals or had pictured the Soviet Union as attempting to catch up to the United States, Peking has now begun to portray the Soviet Union as having surpassed the United States in military power and as posing a direct threat to U.S. national security. A 7 September NCNA article reported a recent increase in the deployment of Soviet air reconnaissance and naval forces along the eastern coast of the United States and in the Caribbean area and noted the "uneasiness" and "close attention" exhibited by U.S. authorities to these movements. NCNA on 1 September quoted from a Japanese military publication to note that while the United States has been "bogged down in a quagmire in Indochina, the Soviet Union has intensified unbridledly its military buildup." It went on to compare the naval strengths of the two powers, asserting that "while 80 percent of U.S. Navy boats are over 20 years old and about to be deactivated, the Soviet Union has armed its navy with powerful new type vessels."

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 15 -

## NOTES

USSR ON POMPIDOU PRC VISIT: Moscow has sought to portray the 11-17 September visit to the PRC by French President Pompidou as a failure for Chinese diplomacy. Promptly replaying Pompidou's press conference remark of the 14th that his trip was directed "neither at the Soviet Union, nor at any other country," Moscow has gone on to assert that "Peking's pathological anti-Sovietism found no support with the French" and that the Chinese "failed" to "impose" on the French their view of Europe. Moscow has also cited Pompidou's statement made in Peking that he and Brezhnev will continue their series of "regular" meetings "early next year." NCNA's report on Pompidou's Peking press conference predictably omitted the French president's remarks on the Soviet Union.

USSR DISSIDENTS: In a Moscow radio commentary in English beamed to North America on the 18th, Moscow has denounced the 17 September Senate resolution criticizing Soviet policy on domestic dissidence as a gross interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and a return to the cold war. This is the first direct Soviet reaction to American statements on this score. Moscow did not comment on the statements made on this subject by the National Academy of Sciences, by Representative Wilbur Mills, or by HEW Secretary Weinberger on his return from Moscow. The gist of the radio commentary was that the Senate resolution was out of line with the thinking of U.S. "national leaders," and it cited a speech by President Nixon in Moscow last year and testimony by Kissinger before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to support this contention.

REACTIONS TO LAO PROTOCOL: North Vietnamese leaders sent congratulatory messages to Lao leaders on the signing of the protocol implementing the February cease-fire agreement. Unlike the situation in February, when Soviet and Chinese leaders respectively sent messages to various Lao leaders, Moscow and Peking confined their current reactions to favorable press commentaries. Peking continues the practice of disseminating through NCNA significant materials on Laos carried in Pathet Lao, North Vietnamese and PRG media, but deleting the sharpest criticisms of the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS  
19 SEPTEMBER 1973

- 1 -

# APPENDIX

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 10 - 16 SEPTEMBER 1973

<u>Moscow (3028 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1243 items)</u>		
Chilean Coup	(--)	19%	Domestic Issues	(45%)	33%
[CPSU Central	(--)	7%]	[CCP 10th Congress	(40%)	11%]
Committee Statement			Pompidou in PRC	(--)	16%
China	(8%)	9%	4th Nonaligned Summit	(14%)	15%
[CCP 10th Congress	(3%)	2%]	Conference, Algiers		
4th Nonaligned Summit	(8%)	7%	Indochina	(7%)	7%
Conference, Algiers			[Laotian Protocol	(1%)	4%]
Bulgarian National Day	(5%)	6%	Chilean Coup	(--)	4%
Indochina	(4%)	1%	DPRK National Day	(5%)	4%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.